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I. INTRODUCTION
Public Choice Theory postulates that politicians rely on the "finan-
cial backing, publicity and endorsements" provided by organized interest
groups to get elected and thus can be bribed to do the legislative bidding
of those groups.' Adherents to Public Choice Theory have suggested,
with some success, that the theory's normative implications should guide
judges, legislators, and other policymakers in their legal and public pol-
icy decisions. 2 The centerpiece of this theory is the concept of "rent-
* Associate, Spivak, Lipton, Watanabe, Spivak & Moss LLP, New York, New York.
I would like to thank Professor John 0. McGinnis of Benjamin Cardozo School of Law
for his helpful comments and encouragement with this article.
1. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 23 (1991).
2. See generally id. at 63-143.
(203)
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seeking," which can be defined as the actions and decisions of political
actors that result in wealth transfers which reduce the economic well-
being of society.' Thus, the basis for the normative application of Public
Choice Theory depends on an accurate determination of what political
behavior may be defined as rent-seeking.
The problem of defining rent-seeking behavior, however, represents
the principal barrier to Public Choice Theory as positive law because the
concept reflects a simplistic, two-dimensional approach that fails to ac-
count for the political reality of policymaking. This article employs a
Public Choice analysis of the dispute between France and the United
States regarding treatment of film and audiovisual products under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to demonstrate how the
simplistic definition of rent-seeking limits the normative application of
Public Choice Theory.
Specifically, this article looks at two problems that French and
American trade negotiators faced in the audiovisual products dispute. The
first problem centers on the question of whether France's fight to main-
tain trade barriers on cultural products could legitimately be labeled rent-
seeking behavior. This problem is a common one that reflects a debate
which Public Choice Theorists have had over when interests in the com-
mon good of society outweigh inefficient market policies.
The French and American audiovisual products dispute particularly
highlights the more interesting problem of defining the behavior of a spe-
cial interest group that does not satisfy the usual indicia of rent-seeking
behavior. The American entertainment industry advocated what would
normally be an efficient market solution, the removal of trade barriers.
However, had the United States refused to compromise on the issue of
the inclusion of audiovisual products in GATT, the talks would have col-
lapsed without a final agreement. The result would have been an even
more economically inefficient outcome because American industry as a
whole benefited much more from GATT than the potential gains the en-
tertainment industry lost as a result of the failure of its GATT agenda.
Thus, there is a paradox of competing economically efficient outcomes
that the concept of rent-seeking behavior fails to capture.
The audiovisual products dispute illustrates how one economically
efficient policy may in fact be inefficient if it trumps a greater wealth-
creating policy. It similarly illustrates how a seemingly inefficient, rent-
seeking public policy may in fact be efficient if it satisfies public con-
cerns on a controversial matter, thereby preventing a potentially greater
inefficient political outcome. This failure to address the complex political
3. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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reality in which political actors actually make choices renders the Public
Choice Theory a poor predictor of political behavior and makes it of lim-
ited utility as positive law.
When the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks concluded on Decem-
ber 14, 1993, one of the most difficult, final hurdles the negotiators had
to overcome was the dispute between France and the United States re-
garding the treatment of film and audiovisual products under the GATT.
4
In the end, France won the dispute.5 France and other European Commu-
nity countries wanted the audiovisual sector to be excluded from the ser-
vices section6 of the GATT talks; the United States wanted the sector in-
cluded. 7 The American entertainment industry, which lobbied heavily for
inclusion, was seen as the "big loser."8
To those who subscribe to the theory of Public Choice, this outcome
would seem surprising. Agreement on removal of all trade restrictions on
film and audiovisual products was very important to the American en-
tertainment industry.9 President Clinton was "particularly indebted to
Hollywood" because of his and the Democratic Party's close ties to
Hollywood. 10 Clinton's choice for United States Trade Representative was
Mickey Kantor, a "Los Angeles lawyer with close ties to the movie busi-
ness," and the chief lobbyist for the film industry was Jack Valenti, pres-
ident of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), a Democrat
and former special assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson." Clinton
had met with top entertainment industry executives a couple of months
before completion of the talks to pledge that the United States would
"not accept trade restrictions or quotas" on audiovisual products.2
4. See Jonas M. Grant, 'Jurassic' Trade Dispute: The Exclusion of the Audiovisual
Sector from the GAIT, 70 IND. L.J. 1333, 1336 (1995). See also Keith Bradsher, The
World Trade Agreement: U.S. and Europe Clear the Way for a World Accord on Trade,
Setting Aside Major Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at Al; Roger Cohen, The
World Trade Agreement: A Realignment Made Reluctantly, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.15, 1993, at
D19.
5. See Marc Sandalow et al., Historic Global Trade Pact: GAT Issues Resolved by
116 Nations, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 15, 1993, at Al; Bernard Weinraub, The World Trade
Agreement: The Hollywood Reaction; Clinton Spared Blame by Hollywood Officials, N.Y.
TimEs, Dec. 16, 1993, at Dl.
6. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
7. See 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 38, at 1628 (Sept. 29, 1993); Grant, supra
note 4.
8. Grant, supra note 4, at 1334.
9. See David J. Fox, Entertainment Industry Gets Clinton's Free Trade Pledge, L.A.
TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1993, at D5.
10. Grant, supra note 4, at 1354-55. See also Weinraub supra note 5.
11. Weinraub, supra note 5.
12. Fox, supra note 9. The participants in the White House meeting included MCA
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Public Choice Theory would lead one to predict that this was a situ-
ation in which the Clinton Administration would deliver the trade poli-
cies favored by the American entertainment industry, but that did not
happen. This article explains why that did not happen. Furthermore, this
article argues that Public Choice Theory is limited in its ability to evalu-
ate and predict the choices made by political actors because it fails to
recognize and take account of the complexity of the social and economic
circumstances at the time such decisions are made.
Part II of this article describes the dispute between France and the
United States over GATT treatment of audiovisual products. It explains
the relationship between the political actors in each country and their re-
lationship to their respective entertainment interest groups. Most impor-
tantly, this part describes how national identity and fears of cultural im-
perialism in France and Europe created a powerful force united against
the United States, and insured that purely economic efficiency arguments
would lose out to cultural protection.
Part III evaluates the application of Public Choice Theory to interna-
tional trade policy. While Public Choice Theory usually looks at the be-
havior of legislatures, it has been used to assess the actions of the Execu-
tive Branch as well. Thus, because the power to make international trade
policy is chiefly within the authority of the Executive Branch, this part
describes how Public Choice Theory has been applied to both the Execu-
tive Branch and international affairs.
Finally, Part IV explores the Public Choice Theory implications of
the audiovisual products dispute at the GATT. It demonstrates the limits
of the Public Choice analysis as applied to international economic rela-
tions, specifically the problem of determining when political actors' be-
havior can rightly be labeled as rent-seeking. This article attempts to
demonstrate that, although the U.S. entertainment industry was fighting
for what most people would consider the most efficient market solution
for the treatment of audiovisual products in the GATT, that fight was
paradoxically rent-seeking behavior.
II. THE PROBLEM: EUROPEAN TRADE RESTRICTIONS ON FILM AND
AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTS
In addition to President Clinton's ties to the American entertainment
industry, there were other obvious reasons for the United States to push
Chairman Lew Wasserman and President Sidney Sheinberg, Paramount Communications
Chairman Martin Davis, Viacom Chairman Sumner Redstone, Walt Disney Co. President
Frank Wells, Warner Bros. President Terry Semel, Sony Pictures President Alan Levine
and Fox President Chase Carey. Id.
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so hard for free trade treatment of the American entertainment industry.
The American entertainment industry is the second largest export indus-
try in the U.S. after the aerospace and aviation sector, generating foreign
revenues of approximately $18 billion annually and producing a trade
surplus of $4 billion in 1992 alone.' 3 Furthermore, 414,700 workers were
directly employed in the film industry and, for every two direct jobs,
three were created in support industries.'
4
The two major sources of friction between the European Union
(EU) and the United States regarding trade restrictions on audiovisual
products were national quotas 6n European television and subsidies for
European films.' 5 Adding to this friction, France was "the most aggres-
sive and vocal [EU member] in opposing free audiovisual trade."' 16 In
fact, the battle was widely and accurately perceived as a fight between
the Americans and the French. 7 The United States wanted the audiovi-
sual sector fully covered by the GATT and governed by the free trade
rules embodied in the GATS, while France and the EU wanted special
treatment so that "cultural goods" would be treated differently than in-
dustrial and service products.'8
The national quotas were embodied in what came to be known as
the "Television Without Frontiers Directive.'' 9 This Directive was an at-
tempt by the EU to integrate the member states into a single market with
standardized broadcast regulations. The Directive used quotas to create a
"cultural safety net" designed to protect the television industries of the
member states in order to foster and preserve common European values
and goals.20 The quotas, which sought to limit American broadcast prod-
ucts, 2' required that EU members abide by set minimum percentages of
13. Kirsten L. Kessler, Protecting Free Trade in Audiovisual Entertainment: A Pro-
posal for Counteracting the European Union's Trade Barriers to the U.S. Entertainment
Industry's Exports, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L. Bus. 563, 563 (Jan. 1995).
14. Id. at 564.
15. Audiovisual: A GAIT Tug-of-War; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
VIDEO AGE INT'L, Oct. 1993, at 40 [hereinafter VIDEO AGE].
16. Kessler, supra note 13, at 563.
17. See Weinraub, supra note 5.
18. See 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 41, at 1777 (Oct. 20, 1993).
19. Council Directive 89/552 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down
By Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit
of Television Broadcasting Activities, 1989 OJ. (L 298) 23.
20. See Kessler, supra note 13, at 566-69; Grant, supra note 4, at 1337-40; Richard
Collins, The Screening of Jacques Tati: Broadcasting and. Cultural Identity in the Euro-
pean Community, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LU. 361, 365-66 (1993).
21. See Kessler, supra note 13, at 568. As of 1995, American companies' share of
EU programming was 28%, or 70,000 hours. Id. At the time the Television Without Fron-
tiers Directive was passed, over 70% of European television fiction was U.S. made. See
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broadcasts of European origin, although members were free to enact
more stringent standards.22 This requirement was the most irritating to
U.S. producers. 23
European Union subsidies to member states' film industries was the
second major source of disagreement between the EU and the United
States. As with the Television Without Frontiers Directive, this battle was
mainly waged between the French and the Americans because the EU
subsidies and quotas had the most effect on American films in France.
24
Furthermore, the French film industry is the most profitable in the EU
and the second largest film industry in the world, after the U.S.25 More
than half of all the film subsidies in the EU were granted to French film-
makers by the French Government. 26 These subsidies were mainly funded
by taxes on movie ticket sales, proceeds from television, and sales of
pre-recorded videotapes. 27 Because such a large percentage of the taxes
were from sales of American made films, the source of the subsidies was
particularly galling to the Americans.
The United States and France saw this fight from very different per-
spectives. The United States saw entertainment products as no different
than any other commercial products, and thus as legitimate items for in-
clusion in international trade agreements. The French and other Europe-
ans, on the other hand, viewed film and audiovisual products as cultural
items that should be treated differently than other- commodities and
services. 28
The U.S. position is evident from the public statements of the
Americans involved with the GATT negotiations. Jack Valenti, chief lob-
byist for the U.S. film industry, said, "This [debate] has nothing to do
Grant, supra note 4, at 1338.
22. See Grant, supra note 4, at 1338-39. The Directive called for a majority of
transmission time, excluding news, sports, games, advertising and teletext services, be re-
served for European works. Id.
23. Id. at 1339.
24. See Grant, supra note 4, at 1340. U.S. movies had only 58% of the French box
office receipts in 1992 compared to 93% in Britain and 70% in the rest of the EU. Id. at
1339.
25. See id. at 1339-40.
26. See id. at 1344 n.109. Total subsidies by EU countries in 1992 were $493.1 mil-
lion, with France's share of that amount being $250 million. Id.
27. See id. at 1344.
28. See id. at 1345-52; Collins, supra note 20, at 361-64 nn.1-16; Roger Cohen, Aux
Arms! France Rallies to Battle Sly and T. Rex, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1994, § 2, at 1; An-
drew Marr, Don't Mock: The French Have a Point, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 15,
1993; 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 41, at 1777 (Oct. 20, 1993); 10 IWT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA), No. 37, at 1590 (Sept. 22, 1993); Jonathan Schell, GATTs Star Wars With a Cer-
tain French Accent, NEWSDAY, Dec. 9, 1993, at 123.
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with culture unless European soap operas and game shows are the
equivalent of Moliere. This is all about the hard business of money." 29
Noting the importance of the film and television industry to the U.S.
economy, U.S. House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-Mo) said,
"This is an area where we're truly on the cutting edge, truly are compet-
itive, and it adds a tremendous amount to our job base in this country.
And therefore we really need to put our workers and businesses on as
level a playing field as we can get them on."30
This view of cultural goods as no different than any other type of
commercial good was bipartisan. In response to French cultural protec-
tion arguments, Carla Hills, President Bush's trade representative and
GATT negotiator, said, "Make films as good as your cheese and you will
sell them!" 31
The French displayed bipartisan unity as well, arguing for a cultural
exception in the GATI in order to preserve French culture and identity.
Conservative Foreign Minister Alain Juppe accused the United States of
"intellectual terrorism." '32 Former Culture Minister, socialist Jack Lang,
said, "The soul of France cannot be sold for a few pieces of silver."' 33
Thus, "[p]erceived cultural imperialism [was] at the heart of the U.S.-EU
trade dispute. EU countries - particularly France - fear[ed] they [were]
being overrun with U.S. culture."' 34 What was even more troubling to
Europeans was the marketing and merchandising behemoth that Ameri-
can movies had become. Many feared the propaganda value exhibited by
American film and its power to promote not only the American way of
life, but also American products and industries. 35
29. Grant, supra note 4, at 1343.
30. 10 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 42, at 1820 (Oct. 27, 1993).
31. Grant, supra note 4, at 1351.
32. Id. at 1346.
33. Id. at 1347.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 1347-49. German film director Wim Wenders said,
People increasingly believe in what they see and they buy what they believe in.
If we ever give up the European film industry, then all the other European in-
dustries will suffer in the future. People use, drive, wear, eat and buy what they
see in the movies. We need to regard our films in the same way as we do our
literature. Books would never be included in international trade industry deals.
Id. at 1347. French director Jean-Marie Pore added, "I want to see films with Italian
cars, British cars, French clothes and European cafes.... I want us to draw on our cul-
ture." Id. at 1348. Bertrand Tavemier, another French director, stated,
America takes film seriously . ..not just because it is a big industry, but be-
cause it sells a way of life. They know cinema is a vehicle for ideas, and they
want to sell those ideas [all] over the world. The Americans take cinema, and
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A variation on the theme of cultural imperialism was the assertion
that Europeans were also defending against an American monopoly by
supporting free trade.36 As Spanish director Fernando Troueba said, "The
Americans have between 55% and 93% of markets in EC nations. They
are not happy with that; they want everything. ' 37 The French argued that
the Americans were engaged in cultural dumping because the size of the
American market allowed their entertainment industry to recoup its in-
vestment at home while earning extra profits in Europe, in the case of
film, and selling for a fraction of the production costs, in the case of tel-
evision shows.38
II. PUBLIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
A. Public Choice Theory
Some commentators have applied Public Choice Theory to interna-
tional trade law.3 9 Doing so, however, is more problematic in many re-
spects than applying the theory to other areas of domestic law because
the political mechanisms by which the government conducts its trade re-
lations are different than for domestic policymaking. 40 A brief description
of Public Choice Theory is necessary to see why this is so.
Public Choice Theory is also known as the "interest group or eco-
nomic theory of legislation." '41 It posits the view that the legislative pro-
cess is a microeconomic system where legislative activity is governed by
pressure groups that use "political instruments" to further their inter-
the propaganda power of images, very seriously.
Id.
36. See id. at 1351.
37. Fox, supra note 9.
38. See Grant, supra note 4, at 1351. Richard Self, U.S. negotiator for GATS,
agreed that the Americans had "certain economic advantages" because of the size of
their market. See supra note 7, at 1628.
39. See generally Paul B. Stephan, IIn, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International
Economic Law: Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and International Ec-
onomic Law, 10 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 745 (1995); see also Jonathan Turley, Dual-
istic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 239-59
(1993).
40. Furthermore, the application of Public Choice Theory to international trade law
often implicates questions of national sovereignty and cultural identity in the countries
with which the United States conducts its trade, thereby inflaming nationalist sentiments
and rendering outcomes more unpredictable.
41. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv, 223, 224 n.6 (1986) [herein-
after Macey, Public-Regarding Legislation].
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ests.42 The legislators sell legislation to interest groups, who pay for it
with " 'campaign contributions, votes, implied promises of future favors,
and sometimes outright bribes.' " The legislator's motive is the desire
to be re-elected in order to retain the benefits that come with holding of-
fice, which requires financial and other support from powerful interest
groups. 44 Legislators pass opaque legislation which imposes high transac-
tion costs on voters who might seek to understand the effect of the legis-
lation.45 "[Ploliticians can advance their own private interests by identify-
ing and helping enact legislation that transfers wealth from groups with
high information and transaction costs to groups with low information
and transaction costs." Groups that are already organized for other pur-
poses, such as labor unions, corporations, and trade associations, not only
overcome these informational problems, but also are able to overcome
the "free rider" problem that inhibits the successful transfer of wealth.47
The individual who is not a member of a well-organized group rightly
,assumes that his vote will have, for all practical purposes, zero effect on
the outcome. 48
Organized groups thus exploit the rational ignorance of the general
population. Rational ignorance refers to the idea that, for the individual,
it does not pay to become adequately informed in order to develop an
opinion on most issues nor to attempt to influence some political out-
come regarding a given issue.49 For example, Professor Jonathan R. Ma-
cey points out that
42. FARBER & FRIicKEY, supra note 1, at 14-15.
43. Id. at 15 (quoting William Landes & Richard Posner, The Independent Judiciary
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975)).
44. Id. at 23. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the
Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 43, 45-47 (1988) [herein-
after Macey, Theory of the Firm].
45. See Macey, Public-Regarding Legislation, supra note 41, at 232 n.47 ("Legisla-
tors have incentives to search for issues in which the winners (special interest groups) are
easily identified, while the losers (the general polity) cannot be easily identified. By
masking the true purpose of a statute and claiming that it is actually in the public inter-
est, legislators and interest groups lower the cost of passing statutes that transfer wealth
to themselves.").
46. Id. at 230.
47. See Macey, Theory of the Firm, supra note 44, at 47-48. See also Macey, Pub-
lic-Regarding Legislation, supra note 41, at 231 n.44 (stating that individuals have no in-
centive to devote their own resources to obtain legislation that will benefit everyone be-
cause they can "free ride" on the efforts of others who invest in the legislation and
obtain the benefits that will enure to everyone).
48. See Macey, Public-Regarding Legislation, supra note 41, at 231 n.44.
49. See Macey, Theory of the Firm, supra note 44, at 47.
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[w]here a piece of legislation' will cost a taxpayer $50.00, and the
net cost of obtaining information about the effects of the legisla-
tion (including the opportunity costs of the taxpayer's time, and
the start-up costs of identifying the issue) are greater than $50.00,
no rational taxpayer will obtain the information necessary to af-
fect legislative outcomes.5 0
The legislator, thus, relies on the rational ignorance of constituents to
curry favor with well-organized groups that then help the legislator win
reelection.
B. Rent-Seeking Behavior
Public Choice theorists have labeled the efforts on the part of inter-
est groups to seek wealth-transferring legislation as rent-seeking.5' "Rent
seeking refers to the attempt to obtain economic rents (i.e., payments for
the use of an economic asset in excess of the market price) through gov-
ernment intervention in the market. A classic example of rent-seeking is
a corporation's attempt to obtain monopolies granted by government. 5 2
The negative implication of this theory is that the legislation favored
by well-organized groups will transfer wealth from society as a whole to
these groups, thereby reducing societal wealth and harming economic ef-
ficiency. 53 Judge Richard Posner refers to such rent-seeking wealth trans-
fers as "amorally redistributive," because they are Kaldor-Hicks ineffi-
cient, meaning that the wealth transfer "makes one group better off but
makes some other groups worse off by an even greater amount." '54
Public Choice theorists do not regard all legislation as rent-seeking.
They label legislation that benefits society as a whole as "public regard-
ing."' 55 The problem of trying to determine whether a statute is rent-
seeking or public-regarding, however, is difficult because there is no pre-
cise definition of "public-regarding. '5 6 As Professor Macey has pointed
out, however, the concept of public-regarding is vague but not devoid of
meaning. He defined the concept as follows:
50. Id.
51. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 15.
52. Macey, Public-Regarding Legislation, supra note 41, at 223 n.6.
53. See id. at 230.
54. Id. at 228 n.28. See also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 34 ("When econ-
omists describe special interest legislation as 'rent-seeking,' they mean that the legislation
is not justified on a cost-benefit basis: it costs the public more than it benefits the special
interest, so society as a whole is worse off.").
55. See generally Macey, Theory of the Firm, supra note 44, at 49-51.
56. See Macey, Public-Regarding Legislation, supra note 41, at 228 n.29.
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Legislation may be said to be public-regarding if it serves some
purpose other than obtaining for particular legislators the pecuni-
ary advantage of the political support of some narrow interest
group, even if this purpose is the transfer of wealth from one
group to another. Public-regardingness is best thought of in pro-
cedural terms. If the statute in question is the result of a reified,
deliberative congressional process in which conceptions of the
public good were considered, then the statute is public-regarding.
If, however, the statute simply represents legislative acquiescence
to raw political power, it is not public-regarding.5 7
Thus, when applying Public Choice Theory to international trade in cul-
tural goods and services, the conclusion whether the behavior of the par-
ties to a dispute is rent-seeking or public-regarding is outcome determi-
native because how one labels the negotiating posture of the parties
largely determines how their behavior is defined by Public Choice
theorists.
C. Public Choice and the Executive Branch
The Public Choice literature deals mostly with the legislative branch
within the context of domestic politics. However, international economic
relations are largely the province of the Executive Branch. At most, the
Executive Branch needs explicit statutory authority to conduct foreign
policy; at the least, it operates without legislative interference.58 The at-
tempt to transfer a theory of rent-seeking behavior from the legislative
branch to the Executive Branch in order to understand the Public Choice
implications of international economic relations is difficult.
"In economic terms, the problem of 'factions' described by [James]
Madison and [Alexander] Hamilton is a problem of rent-seeking ....
The presence of factionalism in the legislative branch, however, arguably
does not aptly characterize the institutional structure of the Executive
Branch. The drafters of the U.S. Constitution believed the President's na-
tional constituency made him less susceptible to factional capture than
the legislators and, thus, created the presidential veto power as a check
on rent-seeking activity by legislators. 60 Nonetheless, the institution of a
large and complex administrative agency regime within the Executive
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. See Stephan, supra note 39, at 755-57 (discussing four approaches interpreting
presidential authority to conduct foreign policy).
59. Turley, supra note 39, at 241.
60. Id. at 246.
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Branch has led to "the classic form of rent-seeking" behavior known as
"agency capture."' 6'
Rent-seeking does not solely involve administrative agencies, but
may "occur[] entirely at the White House."'62 Multinational corporations
are the interest groups most likely to rent-seek in the Executive Branch,
and have a long and successful history of doing so, especially on foreign
policy matters.63 Presidents have long defined foreign policy objectives in
terms of multinational corporations' interests and have often secured
those interests through the use of military force.6 Of course, negotiating
a multilateral agreement like the GATI is neither rulemaking nor military
intervention, but rather is treaty-making. It has been suggested, though,
that dealing with the Executive Branch engenders high transaction and
information costs which may make rent-seeking easier to accomplish
through treaties. 65
IV. PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTS DISPUTE AT THE
GATI TALKS
Reaching final agreement on the GATT was beneficial for society as
a whole in both the U.S. and France, that is, it was a Kaldor-Hicks effi-
cient outcome. 66 Thus, the critical factor in applying a Public Choice
analysis to the GATT dispute over audiovisual products is to determine
who was rent-seeking, and who was advancing a public-regarding bar-
gaining position. The paramount goal of the GATT was the removal of
trade barriers in order to facilitate increased international trade. Trade
barriers have historically been erected by governments to protect the eco-
nomic interests of powerful groups in society and to enable them, at
times, to capture monopoly rents for their goods. Those who have sup-
61. Id. at 247 (stating that "special interest groups gradually co-opt their
regulators").
62. Id. at 248. As the most recent example of rent-seeking in the White House, Pro-
fessor Turley points to President Bush's Council on Competitiveness, formed in 1989 and
chaired by Vice President Quayle. The Council used the rule-making power to enact
changes favored by industry after the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1990 that were di-
rectly counter to the legislation. Id.
63. See id. at 251-54.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 255.
66. While this article posits that there were worldwide economic benefits to be
gained from GATT, this article's purpose is not to give short shrift to the arguments
against GATT by those in the labor, environmental, and consumer movements. The author
acknowledges the valid criticisms of the GATT and agrees with many of those criticisms.
Nonetheless, the economic benefits of increased international trade, which the GATT
agreement was intended to promote, are undeniable.
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ported legislation to pass trade barriers, usually tariffs, have attempted to
disguise their rent-seeking activity by arguing that they are promoting the
public welfare by, for 'example, preserving jobs or the tax base. Trade
barriers, then, are a classic example of rent-seeking behavior.67 Thus,
with regard to the GATT talks, most Public Choice theorists would agree
that one fighting for the elimination of trade barriers would be advancing
a public-regarding goal.
This article demonstrates, however, that this is not necessarily true.
Fighting, as the American entertainment industry did, for the elimination
of trade barriers can in fact be rent-seeking because it can be Kaldor-
Hicks inefficient. With regard to the dispute over the treatment of audio-
visual products in the GATT, the United States trade negotiators did not
necessarily cave in to rent-seeking behavior when they accepted the re-
tention of trade barriers in the final agreement.
This part of the article analyzes the bargaining positions of the par-
ties to the dispute using the concepts developed in Public Choice Theory.
Generally, this part seeks to examine to what extent the bargaining posi-
tions of France and the United States were the product of rent-seeking
activities. In other words, it analyzes the extent to which the bargaining
positions were the product of interest group manipulation of transaction
costs, capture of executive agencies, and reliance on opaque legislation to
transfer wealth. Furthermore, it seeks to examine the extent to which the
parties may have been acting in a public-regarding manner.
A. France: Defense Against Anglo-Saxon Cultural Imperialism
This part of the article has a two-fold purpose. It demonstrates that
France, in its dispute with the United States over audiovisual products,
had the capacity to prevent final passage of the GATT because it could
bind the EU to withhold GATT approval. This part also argues that
France's bargaining position with regard to audiovisual products was not
rent-seeking.
The structure of the EU is such that interest groups with the power
to capture the government of one EU member usually have the power to
bind all EU members with regard to international trade agreements. This
is so because the EU has assumed the GATT obligations of its member
67. For example, legislators pass legislation instituting a high tariff on a good to
benefit a special interest that contributes to the legislators' political campaigns. The legis-
lators rely on the rational ignorance of the voter who is unaware of the connection be-
tween the higher costs of the good and the tariff. Thus, the tariff is opaque legislation
which would impose high transaction costs on voters who may wish to learn and under-
stand the implications of the legislation and fight for its repeal or against its enactment.
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states,6 including the power to bind the member states in commercial
agreements such as GATT.69
The Council, the decisionmaking body of the EU, represents the in-
terests of the EU's member states and has the authority to direct the
GATT negotiations and approve the final agreement. 70 Voting on most
matters is by a qualified majority, which means that member states gen-
erally have the power to veto any measure that is "contrary to the vital
interest of the State concemed."' 71 Because the cultural exception was in
the vital interest of France and other EU members, France had virtual
veto power over the EU's acceptance of the GATT and could bind the
EU to its position.72 For the French film industry, transaction costs were
considerably lower than they would otherwise have been without the EU.
Consequently, to the extent they could manipulate transaction costs to en-
gage in rent-seeking behavior, the French film industry was in a position
to capture the legislative body of the entire EU, which was a powerful
counterweight against a larger country like the United States.
Was the French film industry, however, engaging in rent-seeking be-
havior? Was the French Government's insistence on the cultural excep-
tion, to use Professor Macey's formulation, "acquiescence to raw politi-
cal power," or the result of a deliberative process which considered the
public good?73
In France, media coverage of the GATT was intense and political
discourse was impassioned. 74 Creative talent in Europe was very much
involved in the fight for exclusion of cultural goods from GATT. 7 Also,
68. See T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 184 (3rd
ed. 1994).
69. Id. at 166.
70. Id. at 17. See also SEYMOUR J. RUBIN & MARK L. JoNEs., CoNFLICr AND RESOLU-
TION IN US-EC TRADE RELATIoNs 77 (1989).
71. HARTLEY, supra note 68, at 19-23.
72. But cf. Grant, supra note 4, at 1336 n.36 (noting that British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher suggested at the time that the EU be ready to accept the GAIT with-
out France).
73. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
74. See Grant, supra note 4, at 1346.
75. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. See also Fox, supra note 9 (dis-
cussing support for the French position by French director Claude Berni, German director
Wim Wenders, French director Coline Serreau, Russian director Andrei Konshalovsky,
Belgian director Andre Delvaux, and Spanish director Fernando Troueba); Marr, supra
note 28 (support by French actor Gerard Depardieu); VIDEO AGE, supra note 15 (support
by French director Alain Corneau); Cohen, supra note 4 (support by French philosopher
Regis Debray); David Robinson, A Case of Hollywood - or Bust?; GA7T Squabble Over
Film and TV, TiMEs (London), Dec. 16, 1993, available in 1993 WL 11431458 (support
by Italian director Bernardo Bertolucci); Cohen, supra note 28 (support by Wenders,
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support by French politicians for the French film industry was biparti-
san.76 Thus, the argument that the French film industry engaged in inter-
est group capture of their government's trade policy, a predicate act to
successful rent-seeking, is not apparent because there was strong ap-
proval throughout French society for the bargaining position pursued by
the French Government. 77
Public Choice Theory tells us that legislatures engage in rent-
seeking wealth transfers by passing opaque legislation which hides the
true costs of the legislation to the average voter.7s However, this is not
the case in France because French subsidies for their filmmakers are de-
rived from dedicated taxes on movie ticket sales, proceeds from televi-
sion, and sales of pre-recorded videotapes. Thus, the taxes are transparent
because French consumers of films do not incur transaction costs to de-
termine the cost to them of the film subsidies which they are aware of
empirically whenever they pay for cinema tickets or other audiovisual
products.79 Despite these taxes, France's position at the GATT was politi-
cally popular at home.w
It does not seem, then, that the French film industry had satisfied
the necessary indicia for Public Choice theorists to label its actions as
rent-seeking.8' Public choice advocates and their critics both recognize
the limitations of measuring all government actions by an efficiency stan-
dard. Professor Macey has recognized that some wealth transfers are pub-
lic-regarding.82 Professors Farber and Frickey have stated that "rent-
seeking can be justified when it advances other social values."8 3 They
give as an example the issue of public access for the handicapped. Soci-
ety may find, in the interest of social justice, that this goal is worthwhile
Spanish director Pedro Almodovar, British director David Puttnam, French philosopher
Regis Debray).
76. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
77. See Macey, supra note 52.
78. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
79. See Grant, supra note 4, at 1344. But cf Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Man-
dates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest,
and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1355, 1374 (1993) (stating that taxpayers "do not
appreciate the link between their municipal tax bills and their legislators' adoption of un-
funded mandates").
80. See Grant, supra note 4, at 1349.
81. Some Public Choice advocates may likely view the French response to the pro-
posal to include audiovisual products in the GATI agreement as an example of nationalist
hysteria and intellectual rationalization, not deliberative policymaking. From this perspec-
tive, the French response is not public-regarding at all.
82. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
83. FARBER & FRicKEY, supra note 1, at 35.
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and, thus, be willing to pay for it with a decrease in societal wealth.84
Similarly, the French and other Europeans are willing to pay for the pro-
tection of their culture with a decline in their societal wealth, meaning
that they are willing to transfer some of their societal wealth to their cul-
tural institutions. Applying Professor Macey's measure of public-
regarding behavior, almost all politicians in France rallied to the French
film industry's defense, with presumably no politician garnering the "pe-
cuniary advantage of the political support of some narrow interest
group." 5 Thus, France was not surrendering to rent-seeking behavior.
B. United States: The Entertainment Industry Stands Alone
The American entertainment industry is one of the most important
constituencies for the Democratic Party and President Clinton.8 6 Thus,
Public Choice theorists would expect that the entertainment industry en-
gaged in "interest group capture," ensuring that the Clinton Administra-
tion would see to it that its interests were promoted at the GATI. How-
ever, support for the entertainment industry was bipartisan and broad-
based, most likely because of the importance of the industry to the
American economy.8 7 Regardless of the actual benefit to the economy,
presumably a smaller trade deficit inures to the political benefit of the
party in power, whether Democratic or Republican.
Furthermore, much of the political support that President Clinton
and the Democrats derive from Hollywood comes from the creative tal-
ent, who were largely silent in this dispute. This was a trade issue, and
the financial and creative benefits "for performers, writers and directors
were elusive."88 The business people in the entertainment industry were
the ones largely pushing for the inclusion of the audiovisual sector in
GATT. Thus, because the entertainment industry as an interest group was
not unified, the argument for interest group capture of the Executive
Branch is less persuasive.
The analysis of who, if anyone, was engaging in rent-seeking behav-
ior in the United States poses a different problem than the analysis of
French political behavior during the GATT audiovisual products dispute.
In France, the entertainment industry was advocating the maintenance of
84. See id.
85. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. See also supra note 13 and ac-
companying text (stating that entertainment industry produced a $4 billion trade surplus
in 1992).
88. Weinraub, supra note 5. But see Fox, supra note 9 (stating that Spielberg and
Scorsese issued statements against restrictions on works of art).
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trade barriers, an economically inefficient position. In the United States,
the parties whose interests were adverse to each other were the entertain-
ment industry and all other industries who stood to gain from a final
GATT agreement (hereinafter "GATT favoring industries") because, had
the U.S. insisted on including the audiovisual sector in the GATT, the
likely outcome of the negotiations would have been no agreement at all.89
During the GATT dispute, then, the interest of society as a whole was al-
igned with the interest of the "GATT favoring industries.'"'9
Because the general public's interests were aligned with one of the
two sides involved in the GATT dispute, the mastery of transaction costs,
one of the hallmarks of rent-seeking behavior, was not a factor in deter-
mining the outcome of the dispute. In preparation for the GATT talks,
the U.S. entertainment industry and the "GATT favoring industries" pre-
sumably incurred considerable transaction and information costs. Once
the GAIT talks reached the point where the choice was between agree-
ment without audiovisual treatment and no agreement, neither the
"GATT favoring industries" nor the U.S. film industry was forced to in-
cur additional transaction costs because they would have already incurred
the necessary transaction costs to achieve favorable treatment in the final
agreement. Thus, transaction costs were arguably close to zero for both
the GATT favoring industries and their opposition, the U.S. film indus-
try.91 In that circumstance, mastery of transaction and information costs
would not have given either of these adverse parties a tactical advantage
over the other so that one party could "capture" the machinery of the
negotiations. 92
A further barrier to "interest group capture" of the GAT negotia-
tions was the method by which the GATT agreement was to be ratified
by the U.S. Congress. Congressional approval was based on the "Fast
Track" statute93 which modified House and Senate rules so that normal
amendment procedures were suspended, thereby allowing for a straight
up-or-down vote on the GATT.94 One of the policies behind Fast Track
89. See Bradsher, supra note 4; Sandalow, supra note 5; Weinraub, supra note 5.
90. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
91. Thus, Coase's Theorem, which states that the most efficient use will prevail
where transaction costs are zero, proved true in this circumstance. For a discussion of
Coase's Theorem, see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
11-14 (1989).
92. To elaborate, neither party would have been in a position to take advantage of
its mastery of transaction costs to buy the services of the GATT negotiators and thus de-
liver its desired outcome.
93. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-168, §§ 151-153, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975), 19
U.S.C. §§ 2191-2193 (1988 & West Supp. 1997).
94. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18
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authority is to control the ability of special interests to block GATT ap-
proval. 95 The Fast Track rules are, thus, an obstacle to legislators' ability
to trade political support for legislation favored by special interests op-
posed to GATT. While there may be some question whether the Fast
Track approach is in fact transparent, 96 had the U.S. film industry been
so inclined, the industry would have had to urge a "no vote" in Con-
gress to block the GATr. To that extent, the procedure was transparent
because the film industry's congressional allies could not have resorted to
the usual obfuscatory tactics to kill unwanted legislation.97
C. Rent-seeking at the GATT: The Paradox of Competing Efficient
Outcomes
A Public Choice analysis of whether the French Government's au-
diovisual products agenda at the GATT was rent-seeking poses a simple
problem. They advocated an inefficient market outcome, which was the
maintenance of a trade barrier. Thus, if the French Government's bargain-
ing position was the result of a deliberative decisionmaking process
based on concepts of the public good, then it advocated a public-
regarding position. On the other hand, if its bargaining position was
based on the pecuniary interest of political actors, it was rent-seeking.
The question of whether an economically inefficient outcome may still be
public-regarding is a common problem considered in the Public Choice
literature.98
A different problem is presented, however, when one attempts to
formulate a baseline definition of rent-seeking behavior while considering
more complex political issues such as the choices faced by the U.S.
negotiators at the GATT. If only the U.S. film industry's behavior is ex-
amined to determine whether it was rent-seeking, one would conclude
that it was not because the industry advocated an efficient market solu-
tion without attempting to achieve wealth transfers or engage in "agency
capture" of the U.S. negotiators. However, an analysis of the U.S. film
industry's behavior in the larger context of the GATT negotiations is far
more complex than the simple problem posed above regarding the French
Government's actions. If one merely concludes that the U.S. film indus-
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143, 147 (1992).
95. See id. at 148. But cf. Macey, Theory of the Firm, supra note 44, at 52 ("Con-
sistent with public choice theory, Congress' organizational rules are designed to further
the rational self-interest of the legislators themselves.").
96. See Koh, supra note 94, at 166.
97. See id. at 166-67.
98. See, e.g., FARBER & FRIcKEY, supra note 1, at 34-35.
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try was not rent-seeking without considering the larger context, then Pub-
lic Choice Theory offers little to explain or predict the behavior of the
political actors involved in the dispute.
The likely outcome if the United States had insisted on the inclusion
of audiovisual products would have been no agreement at all. In that
event, the U.S. film industry would have achieved only the status quo.
Had their GATT agenda been successful, the U.S. film industry's gains
would not have increased their wealth by more than what all of the other
industries stood to lose if the GATT talks had failed.99 Furthermore, un-
like the French film industry which feared extinction, the U.S. film in-
dustry was advancing no comparable social value supported by the
American public that could arguably trump efficiency interests. 10° Thus,
while the U.S. film industry's GATF fight for free trade in cultural prod-
ucts would normally be characterized as public-regarding, in the larger
context of the final showdown at the GATI', it flunked the Kaldor-Hicks
test and, thus, in reality was rent-seeking behavior.'0'
Even if the United States film industry had been successful in its
agenda, it would still have exhibited rent-seeking behavior. If political ac-
tors enact a seemingly public-regarding policy, but negative public reac-
tion over it leads to the enactment of economically inefficient legislation
eliminating the economic benefits of the earlier policy, then should not
the original policy be rendered rent-seeking because of the political ac-
tors' failure to consider the consequences? For example, there was evi-
dence that the harder Jack Valenti and the United States pushed the au-
diovisual issue, the stronger the support became among other countries in
99. See Bradsher, supra note 4 (stating that U.S. output, as a result of the GATT
agreement, was expected to probably increase by $100 billion to $200 billion per year);
Barbara Benham, Film Flop at GATT Trade Talks No 'Last Picture Show' for U.S., IN-
VESTOR'S BusINEss DAILY, Dec. 23, 1993, at 2 ("Had U.S. negotiators gotten what they
wanted, such as a share of the levies that countries like France place on tickets to U.S.
movies, Hollywood would be better off. But only slightly."); Weinraub, supra note 5
(stating that because of the. tremendous dominance of the U.S. entertainment industry in
the EU, there was general agreement that it would not be hurt by the failure of its GATT
agenda).
100. See Grant, supra note 4, at 1357 nn.236-38 (stating that the public was largely
indifferent to what was happening under the GATT). See also supra note 88 and accom-
panying text (U.S. creative talent silent in GATT fight).
101. Some critics of Public Choice Theory have recognized that using an economic
efficiency standard where economically efficient actors have competing interests is of
limited use as a means of evaluating the behavior of political actors. See FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 34 (discussing the problem of choosing between two economi-
cally efficient states where improving the welfare of one state harms the welfare of the
other state).
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the EU for its exclusion. °2 Thus, even if the EU had capitulated and the
final agreement had included the audiovisual sector, it is possible that
such a victory could have been outweighed by the damage to the rela-
tions between the EU and the U.S. It is conceivable that an outraged EU
populace might have rendered future multilateral or bilateral trade talks
too politically controversial for EU officials to engage in for a long
time. 103 Had such a consequence resulted from the inclusion of the audio-
visual sector in the GATT, then this outcome might still have been
Kaldor-Hicks inefficient in light of the meager expected economic bene-
fits to the U.S. film industry.
D. Rent-Seeking in Domestic Policy: The National Labor Relations Act
While the GATT audiovisual products dispute presents an unusual
problem for Public Choice theorists, this problem should not be seen as
arising only in the context of international trade relations. Domestic pol-
icy can present similar problems. Consider the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), 10 4 which some Public Choice theorists consider a rent-
seeking piece of legislation. 105 To view the NLRA as simply a statute
which transfers wealth from employers to unions and employees ignores
the more complex reality that informed its passage.
The NLRA was passed during the Depression at a time of labor mil-
itancy when strikes were common and interfered with the country's eco-
nomic recovery. Had the NLRA not passed, labor militancy and social
unrest could have escalated leading to more radical changes or even a
complete transformation of the social order.1°6 Although more revolution-
ary change did not occur, if it had, later legislative efforts to curb the so-
cial unrest could have led to labor legislation that American business in-
terests found even more draconian and inefficient than the NLRA.
Compared to the status quo under the NLRA, such an outcome clearly
102. See Kessler, supra note 13, at 603 n.209.
103. President Clinton's current difficulties in securing Fast-Track approval to admit
Chile to NAFTA demonstrates that this is not a theoretical problem. See David E. Sanger,
Clinton Puts Off Effort on Trade Accords., N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1997, at D13.
104. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1970 & West Supp. 1997).
105. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the
Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 708 n.313 (1996).
106. See, e.g., THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF THE WORLD 1012 (John A. Garraty & Pe-
ter Gay eds. 1972) ("The breakdown of the market system [during the Great Depression]
and the social irresponsibility of business leaders produced a loud chorus of disapproval.
The Methodists condemned the American industrial order as 'unchristian, unethical, and
antisocial'; the Episcopal Churchman pronounced capitalism 'rotten to the core'; and the
editor of the Catholic World denounced capital's treatment of labor as 'worse than that
accorded an animal.' ").
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would have been less economically efficient to society; thus, the efforts
to block passage of the NLRA should be labeled as rent-seeking.
V. CONCLUSION
People will always demand legislation or some other forms of gov-
ernment action whenever they perceive that there is a problem that needs
to be addressed. Most of the pressure for government action will come
from organized interest groups, which is to be expected in a democracy
that respects freedom of association and the right to petition the govern-
ment for redress. Interest groups will have competing interests and make
contrary demands on government. When government does act, its action
can be expected to have an impact on the market and often that action
will have an economically inefficient impact compared to the status quo.
Thus, Public Choice Theory's greatest failure may be that it focuses
on how a government action will affect the status quo without consider-
ing the larger political and social milieu in which such action is taken.
Rarely are government actors faced with the choice between the status
quo and a single proposal to change it. Rather, the choice usually is be-
tween many proposals to change the status quo, with consideration being
given to the future ramifications of maintaining the status quo. Govern-
ment actors' choices are between very economically efficient solutions,
moderately efficient solutions, moderately inefficient solutions, and very
inefficient solutions. Public Choice Theory must develop a more sophisti-
cated measure of what is rent-seeking behavior that reflects this reality
before its normative implications can be accepted.
As this article has demonstrated, Public Choice Theory has proven
to be an unreliable predictor of government action at the GAIT. The the-
ory's inability to evaluate complex policymaking questions renders it an
ineffective predictor of political behavior in all but the most basic of cir-
cumstances. Contrary to the predictions of Public Choice Theory, at the
GATT, rent-seeking special interest groups acting contrary to societal
wishes and interests did not prevent public-regarding outcomes in either
France or the United States. 07 Rather, constitutional and governmental
structures in the EU and the U.S. better explain the outcome of the
GATT audiovisual products dispute.
The constitutional structure of the EU accomplished its intended
purpose, which is to protect the national interests of individual member
states when those interests are in conflict with the majority of member
107. See Stephan, supra note 39, at 756-57 (suggesting "that international lawmak-
ing reflects contractual rather than legislative processes, ... [which] makes international
law less prone to interest group capture.").
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states. That France's interest in preserving its cultural identity carried the
day should have come as no surprise to anyone familiar with the struc-
ture of the EU. In the United States, in contrast, "[tihe system of checks
and balances within the federal structure was intended to operate as a
check against self-interested representation and factional tyranny in the
event that national officials failed to fulfill their responsibilities."'' 08
Because Congress has the power to modify and eliminate tariffs,
both of which are major goals of the GATT, whereas the President only
has the constitutional authority to negotiate international agreements, it
was necessary for Congress to give the President "Fast Track" authority
to successfully conclude the GATT agreement.109 The ability of the Presi-
dent to act without the interference of Congress, and presumably its rent-
seeking tendencies, was so critical that the negotiation timetable for con-
clusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT revolved around the availa-
bility of the President's Fast Track authority." 0
When the Fast Track authority was due to expire on December 15,
1993, President Clinton agreed to remove audiovisual products from the
final agreement, rather than allowing the GAIT talks to fail."' Though
the entertainment industry executives admitted that Clinton was right not
to sacrifice the GATT, they still expressed disappointment in him. 12
Thus, Clinton fulfilled the role the Framers of the U.S. Constitution had
envisioned for the President of the United States," 3 acting in the national
interest rather than at the behest of a rent-seeking interest group.
108. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv.
29, 44 (1985).
109. See Koh, supra note 94, at 148, 152, 158-59.
110. Id. at 152.
111. See Cohen, supra note 4 ("President Clinton told reporters that he was disap-
pointed that the audio-visual portions of the agreement remained unresolved, but that no
one 'thought it was worth bringing the whole thing down over [the audiovisual
dispute].' ").
112. See Weinraub, supra note 5.
113. See supra note 55 and accompanying text discussing public-regarding legisla-
tion, which is legislation that benefits society as a whole and not specific interest groups.
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